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PHILIP MORRIS USA v. WILLIAMS: A
CONFUSING DISTINCTION
SACHIN BANSAL*

1
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the United States Supreme
Court held 5-4 that it is unconstitutional under the Due Process
2
Clause of the Constitution for a jury to award punitive damages for
harm caused to individuals other than the plaintiff. Thus, the Court
concluded that, under the Constitution, a trial court could not levy
punitive damages out of a desire to punish a company for injuries it
inflicts upon others who are “essentially, strangers to the litigation.”3
However, the Court confusingly drew a narrow and arguably
contradictory distinction to justify its holding. Under Philip Morris
USA, a jury may not use punitive damages “to punish a defendant
directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on
nonparties,” but a jury is still permitted to consider the harm to third
parties to determine the “reprehensibility” of the defendant’s conduct,
one of the three factors in assessing the constitutionality of punitive
damages.4 Justice Ginsburg in her dissent wrote that the distinction
“slips from my grasp.”5

I. BACKGROUND
Philip Morris USA v. Williams arose from the death of Jesse
Williams, an Oregon janitor who smoked as many as three packs of
Marlboro cigarettes6 a day for forty-seven years and died in 1997 of
7
lung cancer at the age of sixty-seven. The smoker’s widow, Mayola
Williams, brought a lawsuit against Philip Morris, on behalf of her
* 2008 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007); 547 U.S. __ (2007).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
4. Id. at 1064 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6. Philip Morris is the manufacturer of Marlboro cigarettes. Id. at 1060 (majority opinion).
7. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Weigh Limits on Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2006, at A17.
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husband, in an Oregon state court in 1999 for negligence and deceit.
Mrs. Williams alleged that her husband never believed that cigarettes
were a health risk because tobacco companies such as Philip Morris
9
repeatedly insisted they were safe. She testified at trial that only after
contracting cancer did her husband tell her that “[t]hose darn
cigarette people finally did it. They were lying all the time.”10
The Oregon jury found that smoking caused Mr. Williams’s death,
that he smoked “in significant part” because he thought it was safe,
and that Philip Morris “knowingly and falsely led him to believe that
this was so.”11 The jury found both Philip Morris and Mr. Williams
negligent, but on the issue of deceit, the jury awarded the plaintiff
with approximately $821,000 in compensatory damages.12 The jury
also tacked on a punitive damage award of $79.5 million to penalize
Philip Morris for what it called a “massive market-directed fraud”
that convinced individuals such as Jesse Williams that smoking was
not dangerous or addictive.13
The trial judge, adhering to the principles of BMW of North
14
America, Inc. v. Gore, reduced the punitive damage award to $32
15
million. The Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the $79.5 million
award, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision.16 Philip
Morris subsequently filed a writ of certiorari to the United States
17
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court remanded the case in light
of the its decision in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance v. Campbell.18
Thereafter, the Oregon Court of Appeals, and subsequently the
Oregon Supreme Court, again affirmed the $79.5 million punitive
damage award.19 Philip Morris once again sought certiorari.20

8. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1060.
9. See Bill Mears, Widow Takes Husband’s Dying Wish to Supreme Court, CNN, Oct. 31,
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/10/31/scotus.tobacco/index.html.
10. Id.
11. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
12. Id.
13. Robert Barnes, Justices Overturn Tobacco Award, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2007, at A1.
14. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding that excessively high
punitive damages violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution).
15. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
16. Id.
17. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 (2003) (No.
02-1553).
18. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (holding that punitive
damages may only be based on the acts of the defendants which harmed the plaintiffs).
19. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
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In Gore, the Supreme Court reversed a $2-million punitive
damage award, finding that it was “grossly excessive” because it was
500 times the amount of the plaintiff’s compensatory damages, and
21
that it violated the defendant’s substantive due process rights. Gore
set forth three “guideposts,” or factors, used to assess whether a
defendant has notice of the potential damages such that a high
punitive damages award is constitutional: (1) the degree of
reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio between the
plaintiff’s punitive damages award and the actual harm suffered, as
measured against the compensatory award (i.e. the award-to-harm
ratio); and (3) the difference between the plaintiff’s punitive damages
award and the other penalties that the defendant could have incurred
for engaging in similar behavior.22
For purposes of Philip Morris USA and this commentary, the first
and second factors are most important. In fact, in Gore, the Court
announced that reprehensibility was “[p]erhaps the most important
23
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.” On
this count, the Court outlined a general continuum of reprehensibility,
with non-violent and negligent acts at one end of the spectrum, and
violent, deceitful, and intentional acts at the other.24
Subsequently, in State Farm, the Court revisited and reaffirmed all
three factors. The court also provided further guidance for courts to
consider when determining a defendant’s reprehensibility: whether
the harm caused was physical or economic; whether the plaintiff was
financially vulnerable; whether the tortious act was isolated or
25
recurring; and whether the act was intentional or accidental.
Specifically, the Court held that in assessing the award-to-harm
ratio, courts may take both “actual” and “potential” harm into
26
account. Though declining to endorse a bright-line rule for the ratio
between a plaintiff’s harm and the plaintiff’s punitive damages
27
award, the Court stated that the ratio between punitive and

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256).
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996).
Id. at 574–75.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 576.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).
Id. at 424–25.
Id. at 425.
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compensatory awards should be within the single digits because “few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
28
compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process.” In addition, the
Court wrote that “[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport
with due process . . . than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1 . . . or,
in this case, of 145 to 1.”29 The court further reasoned that if a
plaintiff’s compensatory award is already high, then a lesser ratio
between the awards may be warranted, because a high compensatory
award is generally sufficient, in itself, to make the plaintiff whole.30 In
such a case, “[a] lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee.”31 Still, the Court identified one potential exception where
a higher award-to-harm ration might be justified: cases where “a
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of
economic damages.”32
II. KEY FINDINGS
The Court’s essential holding in Philip Morris USA v. Williams is
that a State may not use a punitive damages award to punish a
defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those
“essentially, strangers to the litigation.”33 Such an award would
amount to an unconstitutional “taking of ‘property’ from the
defendant without due process.”34 Without this rule, a defendant
would be subjected to a “near standardless” damages determination,
without fair notice of the punishment to be imposed and without the
opportunity to fully refute the alleged harm to nonparties.35
Furthermore, “the fundamental due process concerns . . . —risks of
36
arbitrariness, uncertainty and lack of notice—will be magnified.”

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (internal citation omitted).
33. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007) (emphasis in original).
34. Id. at 1060.
35. Id. at 1063 (Justice Breyer questioning “How many such victims are there? How
seriously were they injured? Under what circumstances did injury occur? The trial will not likely
answer such questions as to nonparty victims. The jury will be left to speculate.”).
36. Id.
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The Court then proceeded to further refine the first factor of
reprehensibility initially announced in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
37
Gore and subsequently clarified in State Farm Mutual Auto
38
Insurance v. Campbell. Although a jury cannot punish a defendant
directly for harms inflicted on nonparties, it can consider nonparty
harm in assessing the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct.39 The
Court wrote that:
Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the
conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of
harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible .
. . [yet] a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive
damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of
40
harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties.

The holding effectively vacated the Oregon jury’s $79.5 million
punitive damage award, and the Court remanded the case to the
Oregon Supreme Court to apply the new constitutional standard
prohibiting a jury from punishing harm to nonparties.41 The Court
accepted Philip Morris’s argument that the jury could only punish the
42
company for the harm done to Mr. Williams, not to other smokers.
Perhaps the trial level plaintiff’s attorney, who asked the jury to
“think about how many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 years in the
state of Oregon there have been,” influenced this action.43
The Court also found that the Oregon trial court had improperly
rejected Philip Morris’s proposed jury instruction, which reflected the
narrow distinction echoed by the Court’s decision. The proposed
instruction, according to Philip Morris, would have explicitly told the
jury that other smokers, no matter how tragic their stories, would have
44
to prove their own cases:

37. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996).
38. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).
39. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1065.
42. Id. at 1061; Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057
(No. 05-1256) (Philip Morris’s counsel stating that “[t]he whole essence of the idea that we were
trying to convey . . . is to confine the jury to its proper domain and its domain is the case before
it.”) (emphasis added).
43. Barnes, supra note 13.
44. Pete Yost, Court Hears Cigarette Co. Penalty Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 2006,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/10/31/high_court_to_hear_tobacco
_firms_appeal/?rss_id=Boston.com+%2F+News.
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Although you may consider the extent of harm suffered by others
in determining what the reasonable relationship is [between a
punitive damage award and the harm to Mr. Williams from Philip
Morris’s misconduct], you are not to punish the defendant for the
impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring
lawsuits of their own in which other juries can resolve their
45
claims.

The Court agreed with this proposed instruction, and found that it set
the proper balance between assessing reprehensibility for harm to
nonparties and punishing the company for such harm to others.46
Therefore, part of the Court’s rationale for remanding the case to the
Oregon Supreme Court was for the lower court to more clearly
explain the trial court’s basis for rejecting the proposed instruction.
This rationale comes to light through statements made by Justice
Breyer in oral argument: “what’s worrying me about this is . . . that
we’re going to be in a kind of bog of mixtures of constitutional law,
unclear Oregon state law, not certain exactly what was meant by
whom in the context of a trial. . . .”47 His confusion foreshadowed the
Court’s ultimate decision to remand the case. Breyer’s majority
opinion agreed with Justice Souter’s sentiment that “isn’t it perhaps
the better . . . course to send this back to [Oregon] and say, we don’t
know what you mean.”48
Although it remanded the case, the Court did not require or
stipulate any particular wording in the form of a jury instruction that
would satisfy its new constitutional standard.49 Instead, the Court
50
simply stated that the Due Process Clause requires states to “provide
assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking,
not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm
caused strangers.”51

45. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1068–69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1064; see Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057
(No. 05-1256) (Chief Justice Roberts noting that “I understood what the instruction sought to
draw, it’s a fine line but the reason . . . is because of our prior cases, and it tried to draw that
distinction between assessing reprehensibility and punishing for harm to others.”).
47. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256).
48. Id. at 36.
49. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Overturn $79.5 Million Tobacco Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
21, 2007, at A14.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
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III. ANALYSIS
Philip Morris USA v. Williams may be analyzed in three ways.
First, the majority’s distinction is contradictory, confusing, and too
narrow. On the one hand, the holding is that a jury cannot award
punitive damages to a plaintiff based on a defendant’s alleged harms
to third parties, but the jury can still consider harms to nonparties in
assessing reprehensibility. One commentator wrote that the
52
distinction was “shaved so thin you could roll a cigarette in it.”
Another commentator found it lacking in clarity, stating that the case
is an example of “what happens when you’re lucky enough to be in a
position to delegate to others the implementation of unworkable
53
rules.” Some experts have also characterized the distinction as being
“incoherent”54 and “hazy.”55
Thus, a jury violates a defendant’s due process rights if it inflicts
punishment by imposing a punitive damage award for harm caused to
nonparties, but it can properly take into account that “conduct that
risks harm to many is likely more reprehensible than conduct that
56
risks harm to only a few.” If a jury cannot punish for harm to the
57
“strangers” of the litigation, it is difficult to understand why it can
consider that harm at all. How can a jury consider harm to others, but
withhold that consideration in its punishment calculus? In her dissent,
Justice Ginsburg notes this paradox: “[a] judge seeking to enlighten
rather than confuse surely would resist delivering the requested
charge.”58
Justice Stevens, who was the author for the majority in BMW of
59
North America, Inc. v. Gore and in the majority in State Farm Mutual

52. Ann Woolner, Editorial, High Court Ruling in Altria Isn’t Worth the Wait,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 23, 2007, at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=
aAjZU7KgnzLE&refer=columnist_woolner.
53. Douglas W. Kmiec, Editorial, Up in Smoke, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2007, at
http://www.slate.com/id/2160286/fr/flyout.
54. E-mail from Erwin Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Professor of
Political Science, Duke University, to Sachin Bansal (Feb. 20, 2006, 17:06 EST) (on file with
author).
55. Posting of Aaron M. Street, aaron.m.street@bakerbotts.com, to SUPREME COURT
TODAY (Feb. 22, 2007) (on file with author).
56. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1065.
57. Id. at 1063.
58. Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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60
61
Auto Insurance v. Campbell, joined the dissent in Philip Morris
USA. He made arguments similar to Justice Ginsburg and criticized
the majority’s reprehensibility and direct punishment distinction62 as a
63
“nuance [that] eludes me.” If a jury considers nonparty harm to
assess a defendant’s responsibility, that jury “by definition” punishes a
defendant “directly” for third party harm.64 This implies that a jury
considers nonparty harm in setting punitive damages regardless. Thus,
there is no practical difference between directly punishing a
defendant for harming nonparties and increasing a defendant’s
punishment because harm to a single plaintiff was more
“reprehensible” given its potential harm to others.65 According to
Stevens, the majority “endorses a contrary conclusion without
66
providing . . . any reasoned justification.”
Second, the majority specifically declined to address a key
question in the case: whether a punitive damage award that is greater
than the compensatory damage award can be considered
67
unconstitutionally excessive. Although this was an issue for which
the Court granted certiorari, the Court refused to resolve whether a
punitive award almost one-hundred times that of the compensatory
damages is excessive under the Constitution. The Court rationalized
this refusal by providing a new constitutional standard: the Oregon
Supreme Court could either order a new trial or change the level of
the punitive damage award.68 Thus, the Court did not articulate what
amount of punitive damages was excessive, nor did it provide an
69
appropriate ratio of compensatory to punitive damages.
All four of the dissenting justices alluded to a belief that the
punitive damage award in Philip Morris USA was not excessive

60. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
61. See Posting of James R. Copland to PointofLaw.com, http://www.pointoflaw.com/
archives/003568.php (Feb. 20, 2007).
62. Id. at 1066–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1062 (majority opinion).
68. Id. at 1065.
69. See Jess Bravin & Vanessa O’Connell, High Court Denies Altria Damages, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 21, 2007, at A2.
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70
because of the company’s egregiousness in conducting a “massive
71
market directed fraud.” Justice Stevens specifically agreed with this
view, stating that Philip Morris’s wrongdoing was outrageous “for
engaging in a campaign of deceit in distributing a poisonous and
addictive substance to thousands of cigarette smokers statewide,”72
thereby suggesting that the company deserved the enormous punitive
award imposed on it. Justice Stevens also took comfort in the fact that
the punitive damages were largely awarded to the state instead of to
the “private litigant.”73
Under Oregon law, sixty percent of a punitive damage award is
distributed to a state crime victims’ fund, and of the remaining forty
percent that is awarded to the prevailing party, only a maximum of
twenty percent can be awarded to the attorney for that party.74 This
procedural safeguard helps to ensure that a defendant was not
unfairly punished and defers to the State to address any due process
issues without federal intervention.75 Justice Ginsburg also agreed
with this federalism viewpoint, preferring to “accord more respectful
treatment to the proceedings and dispositions of state courts.”76 Both
77
78
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Stevens fully believed that the Oregon
Supreme Court had carefully followed the Court’s earlier precedents
in punitive damages and would have voted to affirm the lower court’s
decision.

70. See Roger Parloff, Editorial, Punitive Damages Ruling: Narrow, Confusing Victory for
Business, FORTUNE, Feb. 20, 2007, at http://money.cnn.com/blogs/legalpad/2007/02/punitivedamages-ruling-narrow.html.
71. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 051256).
72. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1066 (“This justification for punitive damages has even greater salience when, as
in this case, the award is payable in whole or in part to the State rather than to the private
litigant.”).
74. OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(1).
75. Tony Mauro, Punitive Damages Case Could Return to Oregon Supreme Court, LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at http://www.law.com/jsp/dc/PubArticleDC.jsp?id=1162289114222.
76. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1068 (“Vacation of the Oregon Supreme Court’s judgment, I am convinced, is
unwarranted.”).
78. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Oregon Supreme Court faithfully applied
the reasoning in those opinions to the egregious facts disclosed by this record . . . . [N]o
procedural error even arguably justifying reversal occurred at the trial in this case.”).
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Third, the alignment of the justices was unusual with “liberals”
79
and “conservatives” grouped on both sides. Here, the majority was
comprised of Justices Breyer, Roberts, Kennedy, Souter, and Alito,
80
and dissenting were Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Thomas, and Scalia.
However, in the punitive damages jurisprudence, the justices are not
traditionally split along the usual conservative-liberal lines.81 For
example, the more liberal Justices Breyer and Souter have regularly
voted to limit punitive damages, whereas the more conservative
Justices Scalia and Thomas refused to do so.82 Justice Thomas’s dissent
in Philip Morris USA reiterated his originalist viewpoint that “the
Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages
awards.”83 This provides further proof that politically conservative
justices are not unilaterally pro-business justices, because a probusiness perspective would be to limit punitive damages.84
In addition, commentators viewed the case closely to test how
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would approach the punitive
85
damages issue. Instead of providing new insight, both justices
essentially duplicated the votes of their predecessors, former Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, who both supported
limitations on punitive damages as members of the majority in Gore86
and in State Farm.87 Although it appears that the Court’s new makeup
does not change its prior rulings limiting punitive damages, one
commentator noted that the Court’s narrow distinction and its
deliberate avoidance of the excessiveness issue “raised the question of
whether, beneath the surface stability, the [C]ourt’s polarity may have
shifted.”88
IV. CONCLUSION
79. Posting of Ashby Jones to Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/02/20/supremecourt-overturns-795-million-punitives-award/ (Feb. 20, 2007, 10:59 EST).
80. Id. at 1057.
81. David G. Savage, High Court Debate Could Put Cap On Punishing Jury Awards, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006, at A12.
82. See generally BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
83. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
84. Parloff, supra note 70.
85. Savage, supra note 81.
86. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
87. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
88. Greenhouse, supra note 49.

2008__06 -- BANSAL__FMT.DOC

2007]

12/30/2008 4:35:44 PM

PHILLIP MORRIS USA V. WILLIAMS

59

Due to its broad policy implications, Philip Morris USA v.
Williams is one of the most significant cases to the business
community. It was the first time that the Court reviewed a health or
89
personal injury matter with the potential to affect a wide variety of
businesses—ranging from automakers to insurers. This community has
consistently sought to limit punitive damage awards. One scholar said
that the business interests involved were aiming for a “grand slam” to
advocate for tighter restrictions and limits on what juries may award
to punish corporations.90 Amici in support of Philip Morris included
91
the Alliance of Automobile
the Chamber of Commerce,
92
Manufacturers, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America,93 the American Insurance Association,94 and other businessfocused trade associations.
In general, the decision was seen as a victory for corporate
95
defendants, but it was not the kind of “knockout blow” that business
leaders had sought against punitive damages. The Court failed to
provide an ironclad numerical guidepost that may have instantly
limited punitive damage awards in pending litigation, such as the
cases involving Ford Explorer rollovers and Merck’s Vioxx
complications.96 Still, the decision could help curb the size of product
liability awards against companies given the new constitutional
standard because multimillion dollar punitive verdicts are often
based, at least in part, on the harmful impact of a product or
corporate scheme to nonparties.

89. High Court Reviews Award Against Altria, CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov. 1, 2006, at C5.
90. Telephone Interview with Erwin Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor of Law and
Professor of Political Science, Duke University, in Durham, N.C. (Oct. 12, 2006).
91. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 05-1256),
2006 WL 153777.
92. Brief for Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL
2153785.
93. Brief for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America et al. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 051256), 2006 WL 2153788.
94. Brief for American Insurance Association et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL
2252505.
95. Bravin & O’Connell, supra note 69.
96. Woolner, supra note 52.
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Anti-tobacco organizations disagreed with the business
community’s characterization of the case as a victory, correctly citing
that the Court stopped short of articulating what level of punitive
97
damage awards are unconstitutionally excessive. In addition, the
Court still allows plaintiffs to present evidence of a company’s harm
to the public at large for purposes of reprehensibility, which could
sway a jury to punish on that basis despite jury instructions directing
them otherwise.98 Moreover, the case failed to address the fairness of
a group of “similarly situated potential plaintiffs to allow the first
plaintiff who reached a jury to obtain punitive damages that punish a
defendant for having harmed other potential plaintiffs whose cases
are not then before the jury.”99 Thus, a defendant may not be able to
argue that an earlier punitive damage award aimed at punishing the
same conduct at issue in a current plaintiff’s lawsuit resulted in a
punishment sufficient to mandate a dismissal in that plaintiff’s
punitive damage claim.100
Regarding the legal effect of the decision, the Court remanded the
case to the Oregon Supreme Court for reconsideration given the new
constitutional standard. It is expected that either a new trial will be
101
ordered or the level of the punitive damage award will be adjusted.
The outcome of the remand may provide an early indication of the
practical significance of the Court’s ruling in terms of breadth.
Although the majority essentially suggests that a new trial is
necessary, such a scenario may lead to a new jury struggling to
interpret a difficult and confusing jury instruction. One commentator
predicts that the Oregon Supreme Court could manipulate or
interpret the language of its own earlier cases to “pass muster” within
the Court’s new standard.102 For example, the Oregon court could find
that the jury’s punitive damage award was not intended for other
nonparty smokers, but was instead based on the reprehensibility of

97. William Neikirk & Ameet Sachdev, Businesses Hail Court Ruling on Jury Awards, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Feb. 20, 2007, at C1.
98. Id.
99. Howard J. Bashman, Editorial, ‘Philip Morris’ Punitives Ruling May Contain Silver
Lining for Plaintiffs, LAW.COM, Feb. 26, 2007, at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1172224994787&rss=newswire.
100. Id.
101. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007).
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103
Philip Morris’s conduct. But, if the Oregon court simply reinstates
the punitive damages verdict, Philip Morris is likely to seek certiorari,
arguing that the award is unconstitutionally excessive.
State and federal trial judges will likely bear the burden of
articulating this new, difficult standard in jury instructions. They must
avoid giving directions that allow punishment for nonparty harm and
properly instruct a jury on what Justice Ginsburg calls “our changing,
less than crystalline precedent.”104 Thus, the Court’s holding has the
potential to invalidate dozens of state statues and standard jury
105
instructions. Considering the inability of nine Supreme Court
justices to agree on the proper jury instructions for punitive damages,
the average juror faces an uphill battle to grapple with an instruction
that reflects the narrow distinction between consideration of nonparty
harm for purposes of reprehensibility, and punishment based only on
the harm to that particular plaintiff.106 Displaying his wry humor,
Justice Souter acknowledged the practical difficulties of the decision,
107
remarking, “[i]t’s a good thing we weren’t instructing that jury.”

103. See id. (discussing predictions from the lower Oregon courts).
104. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. Posting of Aaron M. Street, aaron.m.street@bakerbotts.com, to SUPREME COURT
TODAY (Feb. 22, 2007) (on file with author).
106. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256)
(Justice Ginsburg asking “[y]ou don’t think that would confuse the jury if they are first told they
may consider the extent of harm suffered by others, and the next instruction seems to say they
can’t?”); see also Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/
movabletype/archives/2006/10/analysis_tobacc.html (Oct. 31, 2006, 11:31 EST).
107. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256).

